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1. Mediation of Group Cognition 
The term “community-based learning” can refer to a variety of forms of learning. One can, for 
instance, insist on an individualistic notion of learning and argue that individual learning can be 
enhanced by factors that may influence it from a supportive community environment. At the other 
theoretical extreme, one can propose a social conception of learning and claim that most important 
knowledge building takes place at the community level, while individual learning is a secondary 
matter of internalization, acculturation or increased participation in community. Here, we will stake 
out a middle ground: that community-based learning should be analyzed at the intermediate level of 
small groups of individuals within the community.1 We point out that small groups typically 
mediate the relationship of communities to their members and we propose a consideration of small 
group cognition as an alternative methodological focus to either cognition in the head of individuals 
or the cultural knowledge of a whole community. This approach has practical implications for 
CSCL and CSCW: collaboration is taken to be a potential emergent phenomenon of small group 
interaction, and the computer support of collaboration is analyzed as an enabling technology whose 
design and use forms and transforms the nature of the interactions. 
Let us consider this article’s title a word at a time. Mediation is the most complex and unfamiliar 
term. In popular and legal usage, it might refer to the intervention of a third party to resolve a 
dispute between two people. In philosophy, it is related to media, middle and intermediate. So in 
CSCL or CSCW, we can say that a software environment provides a medium for collaboration or 
that it plays an intermediate role in the midst of the collaborators. The contact between the 
collaborators is not direct or im-mediate, but is mediated by the software. Recognizing that when 
human interaction takes place through a technological medium the technical characteristics 
influence—or mediate—the nature of the interaction, we can inquire into the effects of various 
media on collaboration. For a given task, for instance, should people use a text-based, asynchronous 
medium? How does this choice both facilitate and constrain their interaction? If the software 
intervenes between collaborating people, how should it represent them to each other so as to 
promote social bonding and understanding of each other’s work? 
The preposition in the phrase is ambiguous. Is of to be taken in a passive or possessive sense? Does 
the mediation of group cognition refer to how the group cognition is mediated by the technology? 
Or, conversely, does it refer to how collaboration and shared meaning are mediated by the group 
                                                 
1 This paper is excerpted from (Stahl, in press), where issues of group cognition are considered at 
length [4]. 
cognition’s act of mediating? This ambiguity is not accidental: in processes of mediation, that which 
is mediated, that which mediates and the mediation itself tend to merge into a process of co-
determination in which each is defined and refined by the others. 
By itself, the term group is quite straight-forward. In this context, we can take it to refer to a small 
set of people, usually numbering about three to six. But combined with the term cognition, it strikes 
many people as counter-intuitive. This is because cognition is often assumed to be associated with 
psychological processes in individual minds.  
The usual story about cognition, at least in the Western culture of the past three hundred years, goes 
something like this: an individual experiences reality through his (sic, the paradigmatic rational 
thinker in this tradition is often assumed to be male) senses. He thinks about this experience in his 
mind; cognition, stemming from the Latin cogito for “I think,” refers to mental activities that take 
place in the individual thinker’s head. He may articulate a mental thought by putting it into 
language, stating it as a linguistic proposition whose truth value is a function of the proposition’s 
correspondence with a state of affairs in the world. Language is a medium for transferring meanings 
from one mind to another by representing reality. The recipient of a stated proposition understands 
its meaning based on his own sense experience as well as his rather unproblematic understanding of 
the meanings of language. 
The story based on the mediation of group cognition is rather different: in this view, language is an 
infinitely generative system of symbolic artifacts (words, phrases, genres, etc.) that embody the 
cultural experiences of a community. It is a social product of the interaction of groups—not 
primarily of individuals—discussing and acting in the world in culturally mediated ways. 
Individuals who are socialized into the community learn to speak and understand language as part 
of their learning in order to participate in that community. In the process, they internalize the use of 
language: e.g., as silent self-talk, internal dialog, rehearsed talk, narratives of rational 
accountability, senses of morality, conflicted dream lives, habits, personal identities and their tacit 
background knowledge largely preserved in language understanding. In this story, cognition takes 
place primarily in group processes of inter-personal interaction, including mother-child, best 
friends, husband-wife, teacher-student, boss-employee, extended family, social network, gang, tribe, 
neighborhood, community of practice, etc. The products of cognition—thoughts—exist in 
discourse, symbolic representations, meaningful gestures, patterns of behavior; they persist in texts 
and other inscriptions, in physical artifacts, in computer databases, in cultural standards and in the 
memories of individual minds. Individual cognition emerges as a secondary effect, although it later 
seems to acquire a dominant role in our introspective narratives. 
Most people have trouble accepting the group-based story at first and then starting to view 
collaborative phenomena in these terms. Let us take a closer look at the philosophical view which is 
sedimented in the term “mediation.” It belongs to a tradition that undertook a fundamental critique 
of the individualistic perspective that goes back to Descartes and even Plato, and that underlies 
common folk theories about cognition. 
2. Deconstructing Mediation 
We can start to deconstruct the term mediation as used in CSCL and CSCW by looking at its use in 
Lave & Wenger’s seminal Situated Learning [2]: 
“Briefly, a theory of social practice emphasizes the relational interdependency of agent 
and world, activity, meaning, cognition, learning and knowing…. Knowledge of the 
socially constituted world is socially mediated and open ended.” 
This theory of social practice can be traced back to Hegel and Marx by way of Vygotsky. Vygotsky 
described what is distinctive to human cognition, psychological processes that are not simply 
biological abilities, as mediated cognition. He analyzed how both signs (words, gestures) and tools 
(instruments) act as artifacts that mediate human thought and behavior—and he left the way open 
for other forms of mediation: “A host of other mediated activities might be named; cognitive 
activity is not limited to the use of tools or signs” [5]. Vygotsky recommended replacing the 
exclusive focus on individual development with a “zone of proximal development” that assessed 
group cognition, the ability of small groups to achieve intellectual results [5]. 
Vygotsky attributes the concept of indirect or mediated activity to Hegel and Marx. Where Hegel 
loved to analyze how two phenomena constitute each other dialectically—such as the master and 
slave whose identity arises through their relationship to each other—Marx always showed how the 
relationships arose in concrete socio-economic history, such as the rise of conflict between the 
capitalist class and the working class with the establishment of commodity exchange and wage 
labor. The minds, identities and social relations of individuals are mediated and formed by the 
primary factors of the contexts in which they are situated. 
The term mediation takes on a variety of interrelated meanings and roles in discussions of social 
theory. The point here is to start to think of group collaboration software as artifacts that mediate 
the cognition of their individual users and support the group cognition of their user community. 
3. Mediation by Groups  
Small groups are the engines of knowledge building. The knowing that small groups build up in 
manifold forms is what becomes internalized by their members as individual learning and 
externalized in their communities as certifiable knowledge. At least, that is a central premise of this 
article.  
Although we can see many examples of the decisive role of small groups, their pivotal function is 
rarely acknowledged. For instance, the two prevailing paradigms of learning in CSCL—which may 
be referred to as the acquisition metaphor and the participation metaphor [3]—focus on the 
individual and the community respectively, not on the intermediate small group. In the acquisition 
metaphor, learning consists in the acquisition of knowledge by an individual; for instance, a student 
acquires facts from a teacher’s lesson. In the participation metaphor, learning consists in 
knowledgeable participation in a community of practice; for instance, an apprentice becomes a 
more skilled practitioner of a trade. But if one looks closely at the examples typically given to 
illustrate each paradigm, one sees that there is usually a small group at work in the specific learning 
situation. In a healthy classroom there are likely to be cliques of students learning together in subtle 
ways, even if the lesson is not organized as collaborative learning with formal group work. Their 
group practices may be structured in ways that support individual participants to learn as the group 
builds knowledge. The peer group may also resist the official educational goals; the small group 
defines what is to be valued as learning. In apprenticeship training, a master is likely to work with a 
few apprentices, and they work together in various ways as a small group; it is not as though all the 
apprentice tailors or carpenters or architects in a city are being trained together. The community of 
practice functions through an effective division into small working groups. 
Some theories, like activity theory [1], insist on viewing learning at both the individual and the 
community level. Although their examples again typically feature small groups, the general theory 
highlights the individual and the large community, but has no theoretical representation of the 
critical small groups in which individuals carry on their concrete interactions and into which the 
community is hierarchically structured. 
My own experience in research collaborations and in my apprenticeships in philosophy and 
computer science impressed me with the importance of working groups, reading circles and 
informal professional discussion occasions for the genesis of new ideas and insights. The same can 
be seen on a world-historical scale. Quantum jumps in human knowledge emerge from centers of 
group interaction: the Bauhaus designers at Weimar, the post-impressionist artists in Paris salons, 
the Vienna Circle, the Frankfurt School—in the past these communities were necessarily 
geographic locations where people could come together in small groups at the same time and place. 
The obvious question, once we recognize the catalytic role of small groups in knowledge building, 
is: can we design computer-supported environments to create effective groups across time and 
space? In order to achieve this, we need a degree of understanding of small group cognition that 
does not currently exist. In order to design effective mediated collaboration, we need to develop a 
theory of mediated collaboration based on a design research agenda of analysis of small group 
cognition. 
Most theories of knowledge building in working and learning have focused primarily on the two 
extreme scales: the individual unit of analysis as the acquirer of knowledge and the community unit 
of analysis as the context within which participation takes place. We now need to focus on the 
intermediate scale: the small group unit of analysis as the discourse in which knowledge actually 
emerges. 
Following are some research hypotheses for a theory of small group cognition: 
• The small group is the unit that mediates between individual learning and community 
learning.  
• Community participation takes place primarily within small group activities.  
• Individual learning is acquired through participation in these small group activities.  
• Both individual identities and community practices are formed through small group 
activities. 
Here are some theoretical issues to be investigated in such a research program focused on the small 
group unit of analysis: 
• Can we make learning visible in group discourse (so we do not have to rely upon measures 
of indirect learning outcomes)? 
• Can we identify meaning-making and knowledge-building at the group unit? 
• Can we say that it is possible for a group, as such, to think, learn, build knowledge or 
construct meanings that cannot be attributed to any of the group members individually? 
• Can processes of group cognition provide a basis for individual cognition and learning? 
The size of groups can vary enormously. Our examples tend to be of small groups of a few people 
meeting for short periods. Given the hypothesized importance of this scale, it is surprising how little 
research on computer-supported collaboration has focused methodologically on this unit. 
Traditional approaches to learning measure effects on individuals. More recent writings talk about 
communities of practice. Many studies of collaboration that do talk of groups look only at dyads, 
where interactions are easier to describe and qualitatively different from those in larger small 
groups.  
The emphasis on the group as a unit of analysis belongs at the foundation of a science of 
collaboration. It is not just a matter of claiming that it is time to focus software development on 
groupware and to develop appropriate techniques (e.g., for assessment of groupware). It is also a 
methodological rejection of individualism as a focus of empirical analysis and cognitive theory. 
Software should support cooperative work and collaborative learning; it should be assessed at the 
group level and it should be designed to foster group cognition. For that, we need a fitting 
theoretical framework centered on an understanding of the role of small groups and the mediation of 
group cognition. 
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